This checklist maps each item to a thing the evaluator can run or click. The expectation is that a security/GRC reviewer can tick most of these inside the POC stack without escalating questions back to ARX.

Where a row maps to a SIG-Lite question we link the question number; items not covered here are answered in sig-lite-responses.md.

> Convention: every command runs from the repo root with the POC stack > already up (./poc/bootstrap.sh completed successfully). Replace > <email> / <password> with the admin creds printed at bootstrap time.

---

1. Tenant isolation (SIG E.1.1, E.1.4)

• [ ] Two-org cross-tenant test

Create a second org via POST /v1/admin/orgs (admin token); attempt to read its data with the first org's JWT — must return empty/403. ```bash curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <org1_token>" \ http://localhost:8000/v1/agents | jq '.[].org_id'

All ids must equal the org1 UUID. None from org2.

```

• [ ] RLS policy enumeration

``bash docker compose -f poc/docker-compose.poc.yml exec postgres \ psql -U postgres -d postgres -c "\\d+ users" | grep -i "Policies:" ` Must list at least one policy referencing current_setting('request.jwt.claims', true)::json->>'org_id'`.

2. Audit-log immutability — INV-001 (SIG H.1.x)

• [ ] UPDATE blocked by trigger

``bash docker compose -f poc/docker-compose.poc.yml exec postgres \ psql -U postgres -d postgres \ -c "UPDATE audit_log SET status='tampered' WHERE id IS NOT NULL;" ` Must error: ERROR: audit_log is immutable: UPDATE is not allowed`.

• [ ] DELETE blocked by trigger

Same as above with DELETE FROM audit_log; — same error.

• [ ] Triggers present after a fresh restore

python scripts/dr/integrity_check.py "$DATABASE_URL" returns audit_log_immutability_triggers PASS.

3. Encryption posture (SIG G.1.x)

• [ ] No dev encryption key in production

``bash docker compose -f poc/docker-compose.poc.yml exec api \ python -c "from app.config import get_settings; s=get_settings(); \ assert 'dev-encryption-key' not in s.encryption_key; print('ok')" ``

• [ ] Connector credentials encrypted at rest

``bash docker compose -f poc/docker-compose.poc.yml exec postgres \ psql -U postgres -d postgres \ -c "SELECT credentials_encrypted IS NOT NULL FROM connector_configs LIMIT 1;" ``

• [ ] Vault is the secret store

Hit Vault UI at http://localhost:8200; secrets/* paths exist under the configured mount.

4. SAML signature validation — Item 2 (SIG E.2.x)

• [ ] Valid signed assertion accepted

pytest arxsec-api/tests/test_saml_signature.py::test_valid_signed_response_verifies

• [ ] Tampered assertion rejected

pytest arxsec-api/tests/test_saml_signature.py::test_tampered_assertion_fails

• [ ] Replay rejected

pytest arxsec-api/tests/test_saml_signature.py::test_replay_protection

• [ ] End-to-end JIT against a real IdP

Follow poc/USER_ONBOARDING.md §3 to wire an Okta dev tenant; first SSO login should land a fresh public.users row with sso_provider='saml'.

5. SCIM 2.0 provisioning (SIG E.4.x)

• [ ] User CRUD via SCIM

./poc/scripts/scim-demo.sh walks ServiceProviderConfig → POST → GET → PATCH(active=false) → DELETE end-to-end using the bearer token that bootstrap.sh persists to poc/.env.poc. Equivalent manual curls and Okta wiring steps live in poc/USER_ONBOARDING.md §2.

6. Rate limiter — Items 3 & 10 (SIG D.1.x, K.1.x)

• [ ] Lua bucket limits to plan capacity

pytest arxsec-api/tests/test_rate_limiter_lua.py

• [ ] Writes fail closed when Redis is down

pytest arxsec-api/tests/test_rate_limiter_failclosed.py::test_writes_fail_closed_when_redis_raises

• [ ] **/health/* exempt from limiter**

```bash for i in $(seq 1 200); do curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' \ http://localhost:8000/health/components; done | sort -u

Must show only 200 (or 503 if a dep is down) — never 429.

```

7. Retention + GDPR — Item 5 (SIG L.1.x, R.1.x)

• [ ] Retention guardrails enforced

pytest arxsec-api/tests/test_retention.py

• [ ] Deletion request anonymises the user record

```bash

Submit + run the worker manually

curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/v1/data-deletion \ -H "Authorization: Bearer <admin_token>" \ -d '{"target_email":"poc-deployer@example.com","reason":"DSAR"}' docker compose -f poc/docker-compose.poc.yml exec worker \ python -c "from app.runtime.scheduler import process_pending_deletion_requests; \ print(process_pending_deletion_requests())" docker compose -f poc/docker-compose.poc.yml exec postgres \ psql -U postgres -d postgres \ -c "SELECT email FROM users WHERE id = (SELECT target_user_id FROM deletion_requests LIMIT 1);"

Must show: deleted-<uuid>@redacted.local

```

8. Observability — Item 12 (SIG K.1.x, M.1.x)

• [ ] /metrics returns Prometheus format with bounded cardinality

``bash curl http://localhost:8000/metrics | grep arxsec_http_requests_total | head ``

• [ ] PII scrubber drops sensitive keys

pytest arxsec-api/tests/test_observability.py::test_scrubber_redacts_sensitive_keys

• [ ] Production refuses to boot without DD_API_KEY

pytest arxsec-api/tests/test_observability.py::test_production_requires_datadog

9. Backups + DR — Item 11 (SIG O.1.x)

• [ ] Integrity check passes on a clean restore

python scripts/dr/integrity_check.py "$DATABASE_URL" --expect-data-in orgs users

• [ ] DR runbook exists with RPO/RTO targets

docs/ops/disaster-recovery.md — RPO=24h / RTO=4h documented.

10. Trust + disclosure (SIG B.1.x)

• [ ] Trust page renders at http://localhost:3000/trust.
• [ ] /.well-known/security.txt present and RFC 9116 valid

``bash curl http://localhost:3000/.well-known/security.txt | head ``

• [ ] Vulnerability-disclosure policy at docs/security/vulnerability-disclosure.md.
• [ ] Incident-response policy at docs/security/incident-response.md.

11. Compliance package generation (SIG H.2.x)

• [ ] Generate a SOC 2 evidence PDF

``bash curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/v1/compliance/packages \ -H "Authorization: Bearer <admin_token>" \ -d '{"agent_id":"<agent_id>","framework":"soc2"}' \ -o evidence.pdf file evidence.pdf # PDF document ``

12. Billing entitlements — Item 9

• [ ] Subscription endpoint reflects POC plan

curl http://localhost:8000/v1/billing/subscription -H "Authorization: Bearer <admin_token>" plan: business, is_active: true, entitlements populated.

• [ ] Webhook signature required

pytest arxsec-api/tests/test_billing.py

---

When all items are ticked, the evaluator should be confident the platform behaves as documented. Anything that fails belongs in a written follow-up in poc/issues.md so the sales engineer can address it before the next review.